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Alito’s Way: Application of Justice Alito’s
Concurring Opinion in United States v. Jones to
Cell Phone Location Data
Ryan Birss*

On January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in United States v.
Jones, ruling unanimously that the government’s installation of a GPS device on Antoine
Jones’s vehicle and the use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a
“search” and violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the majority opinion focused
solely on the physical trespass of placing a device on a suspect’s car.
Due to advancements in technology such as cell phone location data, physical intrusion is
unnecessary for government officials to track an individual. The limitations of the
opinion were immediately apparent in cases like United States v. Skinner, as government
agents circumvented the holding in Jones by merely avoiding physical trespass.
This Note argues that by focusing on Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones and his three
prongs of analysis (Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the length of tracking, and the
type of offense) and analyzing cell phone location data as something a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in, courts can protect individuals from unchecked
government intrusion.
This Note recaps the three opinions in Jones, summarizes the current technology and the
procedures used by government agencies to access cell phone location data, and uses the
facts of Skinner to illustrate how the surveillance process works. This Note then discusses
Justice Alito’s concurrence in detail and proposes several modifications to his analysis in
order to clarify when the warrantless collection of cell phone data should be deemed
constitutional.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013; Articles Editor, Hastings Law
Journal; B.S., Political Science and Business Administration, University of Oregon, 2009. I would like to
thank the editors of the Hastings Law Journal for their commitment and hard work in preparing my Note
for publication. This Note is dedicated to my parents for their unwavering support throughout the Note
writing process, law school, and most of all life in general. “If you will it, Dude, it is no dream.”
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Introduction
On January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision
in United States v. Jones, ruling unanimously that the government’s
installation of a global positioning system (“GPS”) device on Antoine
Jones’s vehicle and the use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements constituted a “search” in violation of the Fourth
1
Amendment. After this decision, the legal landscape regarding the use
2
of GPS tracking devices changed fundamentally, but the Justices’
rationales for why a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred varied
wildly. The controlling opinion in Jones, authored by Justice Scalia and
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and

1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
2. Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surveillance
in the Internet Age § 29:37 (3d ed. 2008).
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Justice Sotomayor, focused on the government’s physical occupation of
private property for the purpose of obtaining information and that “such
a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the
3
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” In contrast,
Justice Alito, who concurred in judgment and was joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, focused on the Katz test and a person’s
4
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Jones caused a “‘sea change’ in law enforcement” that led the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to deactivate nearly 3000 GPS
5
devices that were tracking suspects at the time. Andrew Weissmann,
general counsel for the FBI, stated that it was not the “majority opinion
that caused such turmoil in the bureau, but a concurring opinion written
6
by Justice Samuel Alito.”
Justice Alito applied existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and
reasoned that the Court should “ask whether the use of GPS tracking in
a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person
7
would not have anticipated.” Under this approach, he emphasized two
important factors to consider when determining the reasonable
expectation of privacy in location data: (1) the length of the monitoring,
8
and (2) the nature of the underlying offense.
Justice Sotomayor filed a separate concurrence because she agreed
that the physical intrusion was at a minimum a Fourth Amendment
violation, but she also discussed the reasonable expectation of privacy,
shifts in technology, and indicated a willingness to revisit the third-party
9
doctrine. However, she expressly agreed that “at the very least, ‘longer
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on
10
expectations of privacy.’”

3. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
4. See id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(holding that a search occurs when the government invades a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.). In Katz, government agents placed a listening device on a public payphone. Id. at 348. The
Supreme Court found this to be a Fourth Amendment violation because the defendant did not
subjectively believe that his phone conversation was being recorded, and society recognizes this
subjective belief as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. Orin S. Kerr, Concurring Opinions in Jones Lead FBI to Turn Off 3,000 GPS Devices,
Considered a “Sea Change” Within the Bureau, Volokh Conspiracy (Mar. 8, 2012, 2:37 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/03/08/concurring-opinions-in-jones-lead-fbi-to-turn-off-3000-gps-devicesconsidered-a-sea-change-within-the-bureau.
6. See id; see also Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Off 3,000
Tracking Devices, ABC News (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.news.yahoo.com/supreme-courtruling-prompts-fbi-turn-off-3-154046722--abc-news.html.
7. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 954–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 955.
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Nevertheless, soon after the landmark ruling, federal prosecutors
chose to retry Jones by replacing the type of evidence offered to the
11
court. The case against Jones remained fairly similar except that the
unconstitutional GPS location data had been replaced with his cell phone
12
location data. As this Note goes to print—in April 2014—Jones
continues to sit in federal custody after representing himself and entering
13
a plea bargain prior to his retrial. Although the Jones majority focused
on the physical intrusion of the GPS device, the opinion did not govern
cell phone location data because law enforcement did not commit a
physical intrusion or trespass by tracking Jones’s cell phone.
In the midst of Jones, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
review to United States v. Skinner, a case involving warrantless cell phone
14
tracking and cell phone location data. In Skinner, the Drug Enforcement
Agency (“DEA”) used the defendant’s cell phone to track his movements
along a three-day, multistate road trip as he transported 1000 pounds of
15
marijuana. The Sixth Circuit held that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation because Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of
16
privacy in the data transmitted by his cell phone. The Sixth Circuit
argued that the holding in Jones—that a Fourth Amendment violation
occurs when the government installs a tracking device to monitor a
vehicle’s movements—did not apply because the Skinner case lacked a
17
similar physical intrusion. The Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Skinner
illustrates the inherent limitations of Justice Scalia’s property-based
majority opinion in Jones.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should adopt Justice
Alito’s concurring opinion as a framework to analyze cases concerning a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone data. Based on

11. See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Cell Site Data & Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support Thereof at 6, United States v. Jones, No. 05-CR-386(1) (D.D.C Mar. 29, 2012),
2012 WL 1576673 (including allegations by Jones’s attorney that “the government seeks to do with cell
site data what it cannot do with the suppressed GPS data”); see also Sarah Roberts, Court Says No
GPS Tracking? How About Cell Phone Tracking?, ACLU Blog Rts. (Apr. 6, 2012, 12:55 PM),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/court-says-no-gps-tracking-howabout-cell-phone (“[I]nstead of fixing the way it conducts this kind of invasive surveillance—[the
government] has simply set its sights on another way to obtain people’s location information: their cell
phones.”).
12. Roberts, supra note 11.
13. Nick Anderson & Ann E. Marimow, Former D.C. Nightclub Owner Antoine Jones Sentenced
on Drug Charge, Wash. Post, May 1, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/antoine-jonespleads-guilty-to-drug-charge/2013/05/01/1109c268-b274-11e2-bbf2-a6f9e9d79e19_story.html.
14. See generally United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
2851 (2013). For another example, see In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th
Cir. 2013) (“Cell site data are business records and should be analyzed under that line of Supreme
Court precedent.”).
15. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 774.
16. Id. at 777.
17. Id. at 779–80.
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her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor could provide the fifth vote
18
to make this the majority opinion.
Part II of this Note discusses the three opinions in Jones. Part III
summarizes the current technology and the procedures used by
government agencies to access cell phone location data. Part IV uses the
facts of Skinner to illustrate how the surveillance process works. Part IV
elaborates on the shortcomings of Skinner and discusses how Justice
Alito’s concurrence in Jones provides a framework of three prongs to
overrule it and similar cases. Part V notes that based on her concurrence
in Jones, Justice Sotomayor could be the fifth vote to make Justice
Alito’s opinion the majority. Finally, Part VI briefly proposes several
modifications to Justice Alito’s analysis in order to clarify when the
warrantless collection of cell phone data should be deemed
unconstitutional.

I. Procedural History and the Three Opinions in UNITED STATES V.
JONES
A. Facts
In the fall of 2004, a FBI and the Metropolitan Police Department
task force began investigating Antoine Jones, owner and operator of a
19
nightclub in the District of Columbia, for trafficking narcotics. The
government obtained a “warrant authorizing the use of an electronic
20
tracking device on a Jeep Grand Cherokee registered to Jones’ wife.” A
magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the installation of the
device within ten days while the vehicle was located in the District of
21
Columbia.
Eleven days after the warrant was signed, government agents
surreptitiously installed a GPS device on the undercarriage of Jones’s
22
vehicle while it was in Maryland, outside the District of Columbia. Using
the device and signals from multiple satellites, the government tracked the
23
vehicle’s movements for the next twenty-eight days. The device
established the vehicle’s location within fifty to one hundred feet and

18. For a competing argument that Justice Alito’s concurring opinion is not helpful for future
cases see Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 325, 332 (2012) (“The greatest disappointment of the concurring opinion, therefore, is its
refusal to even attempt a theory of Fourth Amendment applicability that would have buttressed the
same ultimate holding, but with a test that might apply beyond the particular facts of this case.”).
19. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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communicated that location to a government computer. Over the next
25
four-week period, the device transmitted more than 2000 pages of data.
After his indictment, Jones moved to suppress the evidence
26
obtained from the warrantless use of the GPS device. Jones argued that
the prolonged and constant tracking of his movements over the course of
27
four weeks indicated that the search was unreasonable. On August 10,
2006, the district court denied Jones’s motion to suppress in part and
held that the data obtained from the GPS device when Jones traveled on
28
public roads was admissible.
The District Court for the District of Columbia relied on the
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Knotts, a case involving a
beeper device tracking a person traveling in a vehicle on a single trip on
29
public thoroughfares. The court held that Knotts was binding precedent
and equated the GPS device with the beeper despite the significant
30
technological advancements since the Knotts holding in 1983. The court
found Jones guilty for “conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of
31
cocaine base” and sentenced him to life in prison.
On August 6, 2010, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the district court’s
decision, holding that the warrantless use of the GPS device on Jones’s
32
vehicle for four weeks constituted a search and Knotts did not control.
Judge Ginsburg pointed to the Supreme Court’s language regarding the
limited use of the beeper in Knotts and held that it should not apply to
33
the more comprehensive and sustained monitoring of Jones. He also
recognized that, in Knotts, the Supreme Court specifically reserved the
question of the constitutionality of warrantless twenty-four hour
34
surveillance.
The Supreme Court granted the United States’ Petition for a Writ of
35
Certiorari on June 27, 2011.

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
28. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d. in part sub nom.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
29. 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
30. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
31. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49.
32. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Jones, 131 S. Ct. at 3064, cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259).
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B. Controlling Opinion
Justice Scalia authored the controlling opinion in Jones, which
focused on the physical occupation of the private property for the
purpose of obtaining information and that “such a physical intrusion
would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
36
Amendment when it was adopted.” The Court reasoned that Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence had always been “tied to common-law
37
trespass, at least until the latter half of the twentieth century.” The
Court then shifted its analysis and incorporated the “reasonableness
expectation of privacy” argument from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
38
Katz. Early in the twentieth century, the Court treated property rights as
39
dispositive in determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Justice
Scalia stated that the “Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
40
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”
Justice Scalia also asserted that the present facts before the Court did
not require them to answer the question of whether an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy could be achieved through electronic means without an
41
accompanying physical trespass. Acknowledging that its opinion only
addressed surveillance that involves a trespass, the majority wrote that
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals
42
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Thus, the
majority left cell phone tracking for another day, and its opinion is of
limited value in analyzing future cases such as United States v. Skinner.
C. Critique
43

44

Legal scholars and, more importantly, Justice Alito, immediately
criticized the limitations of the majority’s trespass-based holding for not

36. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
37. Id. at 949–50.
38. Id. at 950 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
39. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
40. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
41. Id. at 954.
42. Id. at 953.
43. See Caren Myers Morrison, The Drug Dealer, the Narc, and the Very Tiny Constable:
Reflections on United States v. Jones, 3 Calif. L. Rev. Circuit 113, 114 (2012) (arguing that “United
States v. Jones represents a missed opportunity to bring a measure of clarity to an uncharted area of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”); Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v.
Jones: Commercial Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth World, 15 U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 331, 332–33 (2012) (applauding the Court for expanding its definition of a search, but
criticizing it for failing to keep current with technology); Monica Mark, GPS Tracking, Smartphones,
and the Inadequacy of Jones and Katz, 27 Crim. Just., Winter 2013, at 36, 37 (“Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones did not address the crux of the problem.”); Lauren
Millcarek, Eighteenth Century Law, Twenty-First Century Problems: Jones, GPS Tracking, and the
Future of Privacy, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1101, 1110 (2012) (“[T]he majority punted on the real question
raised by the instant case: what do we do about the invasive, long-term invasion of privacy created by
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addressing the real issue regarding the intersection of privacy rights and
advancements in technology. Justice Alito called the holding “unwise” as
“[i]t strains the language of the Fourth Amendment; it has little if any
support in current Fourth Amendment case law; and it is highly
45
artificial.” He stated that the majority chose to decide this case involving
twenty-first century surveillance techniques based on eighteenth-century
46
tort law principals. Justice Alito wrote that it was impossible to imagine
eighteenth-century situations that were analogous to the state’s tracking
47
of Jones. Additionally, he compared Justice Scalia’s analysis to the preKatz cases and the emphasis that courts had placed on technical
48
trespasses. Justice Alito criticized this approach because it placed a
great significance on something that most people would think is a
relatively minor aspect of the case: “attaching to the bottom of a car a
small object that does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation,”
instead of focusing on what was really important in the case—“the use of
49
a GPS device for long-term tracking” and data collection.
D. Alito’s Way
Returning to traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice
Alito focused on whether the FBI violated Jones’s reasonable expectation
limitless, technologically powered government surveillance?”). But see Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking
Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L.
Rev. 1, 16–17 (2012) (stating “it is a mistake to treat the decision as a narrow one”). For a more
expansive list of commentaries, see Daniel T. Pesciotta, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth
Amendment in the 21st Century, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187, 230–36 (2012).
44. Alito’s various critiques of the majority opinion included: (1) “[d]isharmony with a substantial
body of existing case law,” (2) the majority “disregards what is really important,” (3) their approach
provides incongruous results (amount of time tracking based on ownership of car), and (4) a variety in
Fourth Amendment coverage for individuals in different states based on the community property laws
of their home state. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961–62 (Alito, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 958.
46. Id. (“Is it possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself somewhere in a
coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements of the coach’s
owner?”). But see id. at 950 n.3 (majority opinion) (including Justice Scalia’s response: “[I]t is quite
irrelevant whether there was an 18th-century analog. Whatever new methods of investigation may be
devised, our task, at a minimum, is to decide whether the action in question would have constituted a
‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment”).
47. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 959 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961)) (“In the early
electronic surveillance cases, the Court concluded that a Fourth Amendment search occurred when
private conversations were monitored as a result of an ‘unauthorized physical penetration into the
premises occupied’ by the defendant.”). But see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because “[t]he taps from house lines were made in
the streets near the houses”), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (holding that no
search occurred where a “detectaphone” was placed on the outer wall of defendant’s office for the
purpose of overhearing conversations held within the room).
49. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher
Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to
Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 117, 149 (2012).
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50

of privacy. In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth that the
51
petitioner used to place illegal gambling wagers. The Court concluded
that the petitioner intended to exclude others from listening in on his
conversation and that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is
52
not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Conversely, what one
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
53
be constitutionally protected. Therefore, the government’s actions
54
violated Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
After Katz, an individual’s property rights and a government trespass
55
were no longer dispositive for a Fourth Amendment violation. Courts
have concluded that application of Katz to Fourth Amendment violations
“depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether
the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate
56
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Since Katz, the two-factor
analysis examines (1) whether a defendant displays conduct consistent
with a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) whether such subjective
expectation is one that society, objectively, is willing to find reasonable
57
to the point it would be adopted.
In analyzing Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy, Justice Alito
argued that the proper approach is to apply existing Fourth Amendment
doctrine and “ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case
involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have
58
anticipated.” Under this approach, he emphasized the length of the
59
monitoring and the nature of the offense.
According to Justice Alito, relatively short-term monitoring of a
person’s movements on public streets, similar to those upheld in United
States v. Knotts, is reasonable because it does not involve a “degree of
60
intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”
However, he stated that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in

50. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
51. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
52. Id. at 351–52.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 353.
55. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct 945, 960 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984)) (“The existence of a property right is but one element in
determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. The premise that property interests
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.”); see also id. (quoting
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001)) (“We have since decoupled violation of a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his property.”).
56. Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)).
57. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)).
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investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”
For these types of offenses, “society’s expectation has been that law
enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long
62
period.” Justice Alito did not conclude how long is too long, but that
the surveillance “surely” became unconstitutional before the four-week
63
mark. One scholar has called Justice Alito’s approach “revolutionary”
for adding two new criteria to the Court’s analysis of an objective privacy
expectation: (1) a “temporal limit on surveillance,” and (2) an “offense64
specific distinction.”
Additionally, Justice Alito did not consider “whether prolonged
GPS monitoring in the context of investigations involving extraordinary
offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally protected sphere of
65
privacy.” In extraordinary cases, Justice Alito stated that “long-term
tracking might have been mounted using previously available
66
techniques.” An offense-specific standard “provides an exception to
67
Justice Alito’s temporal limit.”
While analyzing an expectation of privacy, Justice Alito focused on
how technology can change those expectations and how “dramatic
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations”
are unsettled, resulting in “significant changes in popular attitudes”
68
about privacy. He stated that one of the most significant technological
changes was that “cell phones and other wireless devices now permit
69
wireless carriers to track and record the location of users.” The DEA
took advantage of Justice Alito’s concern about technological changes as
they tracked suspects like Skinner without warrants.

II. Overview of the Technology in UNITED STATES V. SKINNER
A. Technology: Cell Phone Location Data
Due to advancements in technology, the government does not need
70
to physically intrude on a person’s property to track a person’s location.
At the time of Jones, there were more than 322 million wireless devices

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 42.
65. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. For a critique of the offense-based analysis, see Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 66.
68. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 963.
70. Mark, supra note 43, at 37. For another example involving “black boxes” in vehicles, see
Mandatory Black Boxes in Cars Raise Privacy Questions, Elec. Frontier Found. (Feb. 11, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/mandatory-black-boxes-cars-raise-privacy-questions.
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71

in use in the United States. Network tracking has become increasingly
precise due to congressional mandates to develop wireless location
72
technology in order to enhance the nation’s emergency response system.
For example, the Federal Communications Commission mandated that, as
of September 11, 2012, “network-based tracking for 911 calls must be
accurate to within 100 meters for 67 percent of calls and 300 meters for
73
90 percent of calls.”
At the time of Jones, almost thirty-six percent of households were
74
“wireless only,” meaning they had no landline. One court stated that
the “inexorable combination of market and regulatory stimuli ensures
that cell phone tracking will become more precise with each passing
75
year.” Cell site data is “simply data sent from a cellular phone tower to
76
the cellular provider’s computers.” Cell phones transmit radio signals to
cell towers or cell sites when they are turned on so the radio signal data is
77
cell site data. The modern state of this technology was examined in In re
78
U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data. According to that court:
[C]ell site data for a typical adult user will reveal between 20 and 55
location points a day. This data is sufficient to plot the target’s
movements hour by hour for the duration of the . . . period covered by
the government’s request. . . . If registration data were also collected by
the provider and made available, as the Government has requested, such
records would track the user on a minute by minute basis, compiling a
79
continuous log of his life, awake and asleep, for [the] . . . period.

As such, “the data can be utilized to ascertain the location of a cell phone
and the user’s physical location if the user possesses the phone and the
80
phone is turned on.” Thus, the government does not need to physically
intrude on a person’s property to track their location because they can
71. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring) (referring to Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA:
Wireless Ass’n (Nov. 2013), http://www.ctia.org/consumer_info/index.cfm/AID/10323).
72. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated,
724 F.3d 600 (2013).
73. Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical Cellular Site Data to
Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, 18 Rich. J.L. & Tech., Fall 2011, at 1, 10 (referring to 911
Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1) (2011)).
74. Wireless Quick Facts, supra note 71.
75. In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F.
Supp. 2d 747, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
76. United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 949 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated sub nom. Garner v. United
States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005).
77. United States v. Bermudez, No. IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 30,
2006), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on In re
Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751).
78. See 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Cell
Site Location Data, 13 Crim. Prac. Guide, Jan./Feb. 2012, at 3, 4 [hereinafter Crim. Prac. Guide].
79. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d. at 835.
80. United States v. Skinner, No. 3:06-CR-100, 2007 WL 1556596, at *11 (E.D. Tenn. May 24,
2007) (citations omitted), adhered to on reconsideration, No. 3:07-CR-89, 2008 WL 304861 (E.D. Tenn.
Jan. 31, 2008), aff’d, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
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merely monitor a person’s movements by analyzing their cell phone
location data.
In order for a cell phone to make and receive calls or transmit data, it
must be in constant connection with the cellular network and nearby
81
cellular towers. “The proximity of cell towers varies by provider, by
82
location, and over time.” Additionally, the use of triangulation can enable
analysts to achieve much greater precision and reduce the area in which a
83
target is generated to improve accuracy of the technology. Additionally,
84
the production of triangulation data cannot be disabled. As such, since
the government rarely has to make a physical intrusion to gain access to
this information, Jones provides no protection for this type of surveillance.
B. Technology: Pinging
Pinging technology is routinely used by law enforcement officials to
85
investigate and track suspects without the use of a search warrant.
Pinging occurs when the government calls the target’s cell phone in a
86
manner that is undetectable to the cell phone user. By calling the
phone, the government officers make the phone search for nearby cell
towers so that the location of the phone can be recorded in the location
87
data. As one court has explained:
Cellular service providers typically do not maintain records of the GPS
coordinates of cellular telephones operating on their network, but the
provider may generate such location data at any time by sending a
signal directing the built-in satellite receiver in a particular cellular
telephone to calculate its location and transmit the location data back
88
to the service provider.

Pinging is another example of technology not covered by Scalia’s
property-based holding in Jones, as there is no physical trespass. However,
Alito’s concurring opinion would likely give citizens some form of
protection from this type of unchecked government intrusion. One

81. Scott A. Fraser, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old Law: A New Proposal for
Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 571, 578–79 (2012).
82. Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not
Fact, 70 Md. L. Rev. 681, 710 (2011) (citing Paul Bedell, Wireless Crash Course 28–31 (2d ed. 2005)).
83. Id. at 712.
84. Id. In addition to cell towers, there is the growing concern over the government’s use of
“Stingray” technology, which “act[] as fake cell-phone tower[s] small enough to fit in a van [and]
allow[]” for the government to collect cell information. See Hanni Fakhoury, When a Secretive Stingray
Cell Phone Tracking “Warrant” Isn’t a Warrant, Elec. Frontier Found. (Mar. 28, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/ deeplinks/2013/03/when-stingray-warrant-isnt-warrant.
85. Daniel K. Gelb, United States v. Skinner: Using a Cell Phone Is Not a Consent to Search, The
Champion, Nov. 2012, at 30, 31.
86. Freiwald, supra note 82, at 704.
87. Id. at 702.
88. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 534 (D. Md. 2011).
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example is Sprint Nextel’s history of providing law enforcement agencies
with customer location data more than eight million times between
89
September 2008 and October 2009. They provided law enforcement
with a web portal to conduct automated “pings” to track users, which
allowed government agents to simply type in a suspect’s phone number
90
and obtain the GPS coordinates of the phone.
C. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d): How Government Agencies Access Location
Data
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(“CALEA”) requires telecommunications providers to assist law
enforcement officials in isolating certain “call-identifying” information,
defined to include “dialing or signaling information that identifies the
91
origin, direction, destination, or termination of a communication.” The
major wireless carriers received more than 1.3 million requests from law
92
enforcement in 2011 alone.
CALEA precludes the government from acquiring location
information about the subscriber solely pursuant to pen register and trap
93
and trace device statutes. However, CALEA provides an exception
when the location may be determined from the telephone number itself,
94
for example a landline that has an ascertainable address. To gain access
to this location data, law enforcement agents must comply with the
95
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”). ECPA
extended the Federal Wiretap Act’s protections to electronic
96
communications. “Title II of the ECPA created a new chapter of the
criminal code dealing with access to stored communications and
97
transaction records.” This portion of the statute is commonly referred
to as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), and 18 U.S.C. § 2703 is

89. Kim Zetter, Feds ‘Pinged’ Sprint GPS Data 8 Million Times Over a Year, Wired (Sept. 12,
2009, 5:42 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/12/gps-data.
90. Id.
91. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001(2), 1002(a)(2) (2014); see also James G. Carr & Patricia L. Bellia,
1 Law of Electronic Surveillance § 4:84 (2014).
92. Will Oremus, Law Enforcement Wants Your Private Cellphone Data. Wireless Carriers Will
Hand it Over, for a Fee, Slate (July 9, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/07/09/
ed_markey_wireless_surveillance_report_law_enforcement_requests_private_cell_phone_data_1_3_m
illion_times_a_year.html.
93. Carr & Bellia, supra note 91, § 4:84.
94. Id.
95. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 571 (D. Md. 2011); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22).
96. Christian Levis, Smartphone, Dumb Regulations: Mixed Signals in Mobile Privacy,
22 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 191, 204 (2011).
97. In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F.
Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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98

essential to phone location data. “The SCA reflects Congress’s judgment
that users have a legitimate interest in the confidentiality of electronic
99
communications stored on third-party servers.” Section 2703 authorizes
government access to stored communications or transaction records in the
100
hands of third-party service providers. It covers content information,
such as text messages and e-mails, and non-content information, such as
101
logs made by a networker server and cell phone records.
For content, a distinction is made at the 180-day mark of storage. If
the information has been stored for less than 180 days, then a warrant is
102
required. The law triggers a different process (discussed below) if the
103
information is stored for more than 180 days. The court order under
this statute, “often referred to as a ‘2703(d)’ order or simply a ‘d’ order,
104
is something like a mix between a subpoena and a search warrant.”
105
These “d” orders can be used to gain access to cell phone location data.
Location data from cell phones is considered non-content. Courts
have held that location data from cell phone calls is obtainable under a
§ 2703(d) order and that such an order does not require the traditional
106
probable cause determination that warrants require:

98. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2014).
99. Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Criminal Discovery of Internet Communications
Under the Stored Communications Act: It’s Not a Level Playing Field, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
569, 573 (2007).
100. Id. at 581–82.
101. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to
Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1210–11, 1219 (2004).
102. “A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication
service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant
issued using the procedures.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (emphasis added).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
104. Kerr, supra note 101, at 1219. For a chart organizing the differences in a clear way, see id. at
1223.
105. Id. at 1218.
106. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010). Other courts have also concluded that a
warrant is not needed for cell site location data, interpreting the Stored Communications Act (the
“SCA”) as requiring only an administrative subpoena or a showing of reasonable grounds to obtain a
court order for the disclosure. See e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical CellSite Info., No. 11-MC-0113, 2011 WL 679925 at *2 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), abrogated by In re
Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, No. 13-MJ-242, 2013 WL 5583711 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013)
(abrogated by Magistrate Orenstein, who had denied a similar request); United States v. Dye,
No. 1:10-221, 2011 WL 1595255 at *9 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2011) (finding no reasonable expectation of
privacy in cell phone records), aff’d, No. 11-3934, 2013 WL 4712733 (Sept. 3, 2013); United States v.
Benford, No. 2:09-86, 2010 WL 1266507 at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010); In re U.S. for an Order
Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register & Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F. Supp. 2d 202, 211
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (authorizing pen register trap and trace devices divulging cell site data only at the
beginning and end of specific calls); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. CR-0023, 2008 WL 4200156 at
*10 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008). See generally Crim. Prac. Guide, supra note 78.
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A court order . . . may be issued by any court that is a court of
competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity
offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information 107sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.

Hence, the government’s burden of proof has been lowered and
108
only requires a “specific and articulable facts” standard. Under this
standard, “the government may seek any information that is materially
relevant to an ongoing investigation. . . . [including] acquisition of
location data that will not yield evidence of crime but that instead will
109
yield information that will aid the investigation.” The Judge will sign
110
the order if she determines that a factual showing has been made. The
Judge’s signed order is then served like an ordinary subpoena and a
government investigator brings or faxes the Judge’s order to the
111
telephone company, which produces the requested information.
However, under the SCA, any communication from a “tracking
112
device” is excluded from the definition of “electronic communication.”
Tracking devices are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3117 and a warrant based
113
on probable cause is required. Unfortunately, there is no clear standard
and courts are split as to whether or not a cell phone can be considered a
tracking device. A tracking device is defined as “an electronic or
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a
114
person or object.” Therefore, if the “electronic communication” sought
under § 2703 is information derived from a device which “permits the
tracking of movement of a person or object” that electronic
115
communication cannot be obtained under § 2703. In contrast, if a cell
phone is not a tracking device, the government can gather the
116
information. Courts are split as to whether or not a warrant is required.
As no physical intrusion exists with these types of government

107. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
108. See generally In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005). For an illustrative example, see generally United States v.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012).
109. Freiwald, supra note 82, at 696–97.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2012).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012).
114. Id.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C).
116. For cases where warrant was required, see In re Application of U.S. for Orders Authorizing
the Installation & Use of Pen Registers, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (D. Md. 2006); In re Application for
Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756 (S.D. Tex.
2005); In re Application of U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap &
Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294,
304 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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surveillance techniques, the Jones majority decision provides little
protection. The application of these surveillance techniques is illustrated
below as applied to Skinner.

III. UNITED STATES V. SKINNER
The limitations of the majority’s holding became apparent soon
after Jones. The majority’s holding cannot reach cell phone location data,
pinging, or “d” orders because no physical trespass takes place. The facts
of Skinner show, however, that the government can essentially do the
same type of surveillance that was held unconstitutional in Jones by
replacing the GPS device with these nonphysical intrusion techniques.
A. Facts
In January 2006, the DEA began investigating a large-scale drug
distribution network run by James Michael West for which Melvin
117
Skinner worked as a courier. The investigation began after authorities
pulled over another courier, Christopher S. Shearer, in Flagstaff, Arizona
118
with $362,000. Police intercepted Shearer immediately before he
attempted to deliver money to Philip Apodaca, West’s marijuana
119
Shearer became a confidential informant and told the
supplier.
120
authorities how West operated his drug conspiracy.
The DEA learned that West purchased “pay-as-you-go” cell phones
121
for the members of his network to facilitate safe communication. He
provided false names and addresses for the phone subscriber information
that were then programmed with contact information and given to the
122
couriers to maintain communication. Skinner acted as a courier,
delivering money to Arizona and then returning to Tennessee with
123
hundreds of pounds of marijuana.
In June 2006, authorities determined that Skinner was using one of
124
the “pay-as-you-go” cell phones to communicate with West. Authorities
125
obtained a section 2703 order from a federal magistrate judge on July 12,
2006, “authorizing the phone company to release subscriber information,
cell-site information, GPS real-time location, and ‘ping’ data” for the
phone in order to learn Skinner’s location while he was transporting the
117. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. For specifics, see Affidavit attached to Court Order, available at https://docs.google.com/
file/d/1gr1bscSXqb7pXfIi7GXaM5Ywg5sUg-hblBeuodjiasl5KcZ1BQVbPbnKlr5y/edit (last visited
Mar. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Skinner Order].
121. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 775.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 775–76.
124. Id. at 775.
125. See supra Part II.B.
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126

marijuana. The confidential informant provided most of the specific
127
and articulable facts in an affidavit. The authorities asked for thirty
days of historical data and sixty days real-time location and “ping”
128
data. When it turned out that the first cell phone number was still in
West’s possession in North Carolina, authorities then sought and
obtained a second order from the magistrate judge to “ping” the second
129
cell phone number and locate Skinner.
This information revealed that the cell phone was located near
130
131
Flagstaff, Arizona. By continuously “pinging” the phone, the DEA
learned that Skinner had departed Tucson, Arizona on Friday, July 14,
132
2006, and traveled on Interstate 40 across Texas. The agents did not
follow the vehicle or conduct any type of visual surveillance at any
133
time. With the magistrate judge’s authorization under the § 2703 order,
the government agents received location information from the cell phone
company to track the exact location of the vehicle that was carrying the
134
load of marijuana. The information obtained from Skinner’s cell phone
led the DEA agents to locate Skinner at a rest stop inside a motor home
135
filled with more than 1100 pounds of marijuana.
DEA agents arrested Skinner and subsequently charged him with
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute in excess
of 1000 kilograms of marijuana, conspiracy to commit money laundering,
and aiding and abetting the attempt to distribute in excess of 100
136
kilograms of marijuana. After a ten-day trial, the jury found Skinner
137
guilty on all counts.

126. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776. See, e.g., Skinner Order, supra note 120; see also Jennifer Granick,
UPDATED: Sixth Circuit Cell Tracking Case Travels Down the Wrong Road, Ctr. for Internet &
Soc’y (Aug. 14, 2012 9:24 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/08/updated-sixth-circuit-celltracking-case-travels-down-wrong-road (“The orders show that the court authorized pinging and GPS
tracking on a real time basis under 18 USC 2703(c)(1)(B) and 2703(d). ‘Whoa’, you are saying to
yourselves. ‘You mean, the court authorized real time tracking based on a provision of the Stored
Communications Act, without even a reference to the Pen Register statute or CALEA? That can’t be
right.’ Well, its not right, but that’s what the Court did.”).
127. Skinner Order, supra note 120, at 12–16.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776.
130. Id.
131. See supra Part II.A.
132. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 779.
135. Id. at 774.
136. Id. at 776 (including violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1),(b)(1)(A) and violations of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956(h), 2).
137. Id. at 777.
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B. Skinner’s Motion to Suppress and Subsequent Appeal
Skinner moved to suppress the search of the motorhome pursuant to
a violation of the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the government
agents’ use of GPS location information was a warrantless and
138
unconstitutional search. At an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge:
[O]pined that because the cell phone was utilized on public
thoroughfares and was ‘bought by a drug supplier and provided to . . .
Skinner as part and parcel of his drug trafficking enterprise,’ Skinner
did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone or in the
139
motorhome that was driven on public roads.

Furthermore, the magistrate judge recommended that Skinner’s motion
be rejected because he lacked standing for not subscribing to the cell
140
phone plan in his own name.
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Skinner argued that:
[T]he government’s request for cell site location information, along
with real time GPS data and ‘ping’ data . . . in regard to the cellular
telephone in Skinner’s possession was based on the Stored
Communications Act found at 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. This type of
information is considered prospective, as opposed to historical; and is
141
not subject to disclosure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703.

Rather, Skinner proposed that the monitoring of cell site location
information, GPS data, and ping data are types of electronic surveillance,
and searching such information requires a warrant pursuant to the
142
Fourth Amendment.
C. Opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Sixth Circuit rejected Skinner’s appeal of the district court’s
denial of the motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit held that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation because “Skinner did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the data” transmitted by his
143
voluntarily procured pay-as-you-go cell phone.” Thus, the court held
that “suppression was not warranted and the district court correctly
144
denied Mr. Skinner’s motion to suppress.” Additionally, the court
reasoned that a criminal cannot be “entitled to rely on the expected

138. Id. at 776.
139. Id.
140. United States v. Skinner, No. 3:06-CR-100, 2007 WL 1556596, at *14–15 (E.D. Tenn. May 24,
2007) adhered to on reconsideration, No. 3:07-CR-89, 2008 WL 304861 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 31, 2008),
aff’d, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013).
141. Brief of Appellant at 30, United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012) (No. 09-6497),
2010 WL 7355232, at *30.
142. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 781.
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145

untrackability of his tools.” The court stated that if a device used to
transport contraband gives off a signal that can be tracked for location,
146
the police can track the signal.
The court stated that its opinion was consistent with United States v.
147
Knotts. Similar to Knotts, Skinner “travel[ed] on a public road before
148
he stopped at a public rest stop.” Although the cell site information
aided the police in determining Skinner’s location, that same information
149
could have been obtained through visual surveillance. The court stated:
Otherwise, dogs could not be used to track a fugitive if the fugitive did
not know that the dog hounds had his scent. A getaway car could not
be identified and followed based on the license plate number if the
driver reasonably thought he had gotten away unseen. The recent
nature of cell phone location technology does not change this. If it did,
then technology would help criminals but not the police. It follows that
Skinner had no expectation of privacy in the context of this case, just as
the driver of a getaway car has no expectation of privacy in the
150
particular combination of colors of the car’s paint.

The court also emphasized that it stayed consistent with Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, as “the [g]overnment never had physical
contact with Skinner’s cell phone; he obtained [the phone], GPS
151
technology and all, and could not object to its presence.”
Also, the court reasoned that because the cell site data is simply a
substitution for Skinner’s visually observable location, he had “no
legitimate expectation of privacy in his movements along public highways”
152
and “the Supreme Court’s decision in Knotts is controlling.” The Skinner
Court went on to discuss United States v. Jones and distinguished the case
153
on two grounds. First, discussed in Part II, the Jones majority based its
decision on the fact that the police had to “physically occup[y] private
property for the purpose of obtaining information,” which was not
154
present in this case. Second, the Sixth Circuit distinguished the case

145. Id. at 777. But see Gelb, supra note 85, at 30 (“Ironically, it appears the Sixth Circuit
perceived the defendant’s use of a prepaid or “pay-as-you-go” cell phone as evidence of defendant’s
subjective intent not to be followed.”).
146. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777.
147. Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)).
148. Id. at 778.
149. Id. at 778–79.
150. Id. at 777; cf. Recent Cases, Criminal Procedure—Fourth Amendment—Sixth Circuit Holds
that “Pinging” a Target’s Cell Phone to Obtain Gps Data Is Not a Search Subject to the Warrant
Requirement—United States v. Skinner, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 806 (2013) [hereinafter Recent Cases]
(“To revise one of the Sixth Circuit’s analogies, it was as if the police could somehow remotely force
an otherwise odorless suspect to create a scent for the dogs to follow.”).
151. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 781.
152. Id. at 779 (quoting United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951–52 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated,
543 U.S. 1100 (2005).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 780 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)).
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from Justice Alito’s concurrence as “Jones involved intensive monitoring
over a 28-day period, here the DEA agents only tracked Skinner’s cell
155
phone for three days.” The Skinner Court analyzed Justice Alito’s
opinion and stated that there was no “extreme comprehensive tracking”
156
in the case before them. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit held that the Jones
157
holding did not apply.

IV. Alito’s Concurrence and UNITED STATES V. SKINNER
Before analyzing Justice Alito’s opinion, it is important to review
the text of the Fourth Amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
158
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

As the Supreme Court once wrote, “the familiar history of the
Amendment need not be recounted here, we should remember that it
reflects a choice that our society should be one in which citizens ‘dwell in
159
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.’”
As the Supreme Court has also noted that “[t]he point of the Fourth
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it
denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
160
Rather, the Fourth
reasonable men can draw from evidence.”
Amendment “requir[es] that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
161
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Furthermore,
citizens like Jones, Skinner, and others suspected of drug offenses are no
less entitled to Fourth Amendment protections than those suspected of
162
non-drug offenses.
In analyzing Skinner’s reasonable expectation of privacy—and other
cases involving cell phone location data—Justice Alito would apply
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and “ask whether the use of GPS
tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a
163
reasonable person would not have anticipated.” He would also consider
the length of the monitoring and the nature of the suspect’s underlying

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 780–81.
158. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
159. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 217 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948)).
160. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14.
161. Id. at 14.
162. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984).
163. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012).

BIRSS_11 (B. BUCHWALTER) (Do Not Delete)

April 2014]

CELL PHONE LOCATION DATA

4/9/2014 4:40 PM

919

164

offense.
After analyzing these three prongs of Justice Alito’s
concurrence in Jones, this Note asserts that he would hold that the type
of surveillance in Skinner violates a suspect’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.
A. Existing Doctrine
Justice Alito focuses on the Katz test when discussing existing
165
Fourth Amendment doctrine. This Note asserts that the Skinner court
incorrectly applied the Katz test, which has been modified and refined by
166
167
cases like United States v. Knotts, and ignored United States v. Kyllo
entirely.
In Katz, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
168
“protects people, not places.” Further elucidating this concept, Justice
Harlan’s concurrence set forth a two-part test to determine whether an
169
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. First, a person must
have “exhibited an actual . . . expectation of privacy and, second, the
expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as
170
reasonable.”
Subsequently, the Court applied and refined the Katz test when it
held that “a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another” because he voluntarily has shown his progress and
171
route to anyone that wants to look. In Knotts, the police placed a
beeper in a container and monitored its movements along a single drive
172
by Knotts’s co-conspirator from the chemical factory to Knotts’s home.
The Court acknowledged the government’s limited use of this particular
173
beeper. The Court reasoned that a police car following at distance
throughout the co-conspirator’s journey “could have observed him
leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by

164. Id.
165. Id. at 960.
166. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
167. 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the government
gains access to a constitutionally protected area by using a device or technology that is not available to
the common public). In Kyllo, government agents used a thermal imaging device to detect high levels
of infrared radiation inside defendant’s home. Id. at 31. The agent inferred that the defendant was
using halide lights to grow marijuana. Id. The government then used the information obtained from
the thermal imaging device to secure a warrant and subsequently prosecuted the defendant for
manufacturing marijuana. Id.
168. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
169. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
170. Id.
171. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
172. Id. at 278.
173. Id. at 284–85.
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respondent, with the drum of chloroform still in the car.” As such, the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because his
175
public movements were potentially observable.
176
The Skinner court tried to analogize its facts with those of Knotts.
Skinner was immediately criticized as a “good example of how legal
precedent, although ever-evolving, is not necessarily progressing in lock
step with technology and the realities of the ways in which it is being
177
embraced by modern society.” It was also critiqued as a “troubling
178
development” in post-Jones jurisprudence. For example, the court
stated that because of the criminal nature of Skinner’s activities, he “had
no expectation of privacy . . . just as the driver of a getaway car has no
expectation of privacy in the particular combination of colors of the car’s
179
But “[t]his analysis neglects the objective prong of the
paint.”
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test—whether society would accept as
reasonable the fugitive’s and getaway driver’s purported beliefs that they
180
had ‘gotten away unseen.’” This lack of analyzing the objectivity prong
contrasts with Justice Alito’s approach of relying on existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
The court then stated that Knotts supported this rationale because
“[s]imilar to the circumstances in Knotts, Skinner was traveling on a
181
public road before he stopped at a public rest stop.” The court argued
that these situations were parallel because the cell site information that
aided the police in determining Skinner’s location could have been
182
obtained through visual surveillance. The timing of the government’s
use of surveillance in its investigation is one important distinction
between Knotts and Skinner. In Skinner’s case:
[P]olice had not and could not establish visual contact with Skinner
without utilizing electronic surveillance because they had not yet
identified the target of their search. Authorities did not know the
identity of their suspect, the specific make and model of the vehicle he
would be driving, or the particular route by which he would be
183
traveling.

174. Id. at 285.
175. Id.
176. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–78 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851
(2013).
177. Gelb, supra note 85, at 30.
178. Richard Sobel et al., The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo and Jones: Reinstating
Justifiable Reliance As A More Secure Constitutional Standard for Privacy, 22 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 34,
37 (2013).
179. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777.
180. Sobel et al., supra note 178, at 39.
181. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 778.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 786 (Donald, Circuit Justice, concurring).
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This is in sharp contrast to the investigation in Knotts, as the police
watched the defendant make a purchase, followed his car in which the
contraband had been placed, and maintained contact by using both visual
184
surveillance and the tracking device.
The type of technology used is another distinction between the
surveillance in Knotts and Skinner. The Sixth Circuit in Skinner
erroneously equated modern day cell location data with a police beeper.
Courts should not equate cell phone location data with beepers due to the
advancements in technology discussed in Part III. The prolonged
collection of cell location data is much more advanced than the Knotts
beeper. In United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court explained that the
beeper technology is not even accurate enough to determine in which
185
storage locker the suspect had stored the bugged drum. Additionally,
the Court noted in Knotts that the beeper provided limited information
186
and the signals were periodically lost.
[T]he beepers used in Knotts and Karo were simple radio transmitters
of limited range that forced the agents tracking the device to stay in
close physical proximity to the device. In contrast, the functionality of
the cell phone data is essentially unlimited by any distance between
device and agent. Additionally, the beeper device only provides lowresolution directional information, including the approximate angle
between the receiver and the beeper and the approximate distance as
187
judged by signal strength.

Another distinction between cell phone data and the information
collected from a beeper is the amount of detail that these devices can
188
accumulate.
Location information reveals everything from daily habits like stopping
at the same coffee shop on the way to work, to associations with other
people, to visits to locales that reveal much more about a person’s
particular characteristics, affiliations or beliefs—such as a gay bar, a
doctor’s office, HIV testing facility, or abortion clinic; a certain church,

184. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).
185. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 703, 708 (1984).
186. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
187. David H. Goetz, Locating Location Privacy, 26 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 823, 839 (2011).
188. See infra note 220. This is commonly referred to as the “mosaic theory.” See Orin S. Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 320 (2012) (“The mosaic theory
requires courts to apply the Fourth Amendment search doctrine to government conduct as a collective
whole rather than in isolated steps. Instead of asking if a particular act is a search, the mosaic theory
asks whether a series of acts that are not searches in isolation amount to a search when considered as a
group. The mosaic theory is therefore premised on aggregation: it considers whether a set of
nonsearches aggregated together amount to a search because their collection and subsequent analysis
creates a revealing mosaic.”)
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synagogue, or mosque; a strip club; or various political and civic
189
organizations.

The Knotts and Karo beepers did not have the capacity to collect such
190
details or save data that could later be analyzed by government agents.
The Knotts Court acknowledged that the use of beepers is limited,
primarily because it only assisted the agents in tracking the suspect
191
during a single trip. The Court explicitly did not address whether
surveillance such as “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this
country . . . without judicial knowledge or supervision” was
192
constitutional. The Knotts Court held that, if long-term surveillance
should eventually occur, there would be enough time to determine
193
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable. The
Court dismissed the respondent’s concern that its decision would lead to
the endorsement of warrantless twenty-four hour tracking of
194
individuals. This is much different than the DEA agents who had to sit
back and “ping” Skinner’s phone to gather information because they
never had to physically follow him. Also, Knotts involved a shorter trip
than Skinner’s three-day journey from Arizona to Texas.
Furthermore, although the Jones Court never discussed Kyllo,
195
“opinions like Skinner appear to be in conflict with those like Kyllo.”
This Note suggests that Justice Alito’s analysis would lead to the
conclusion that Skinner is inconsistent with the Supreme Court
196
precedent established in Kyllo. In Kyllo, the government used a
thermal-imaging device to look inside a house to determine if marijuana
197
grow lamps were giving off heat. There, the Court held that a search
occurred when sense-enhancing technology revealed “any information
regarding the home’s interior that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area’ . . . at least where . . . the technology in question is not in general
198
public use.” In Skinner, mining for location data was not a method of
observation available to members of the public, unlike a camera used for

189. April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the
Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 661, 697–
98 (2005).
190. Freiwald, supra note 82, at 727–28.
191. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.
192. Id. at 283–84.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Gelb, supra note 85, at 32.
196. Id. at 31. Cf. Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 72–73. (“The dramatic impact that this Kyllo factor
would have had—combined with its complete failure to make any appearance whatsoever—
potentially calls into question its continued viability.”).
197. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
198. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
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199

aerial mapping. As such, it is important to craft a rule that does not
leave U.S. citizens “at the mercy of advancing technology . . . that could
200
discern all human activity.” Unbridled access to cell location data has
the potential to discern a significant portion of a person’s activities.
Citizens do not have access to other people’s cell location data. The
SCA states that entities in possession of this type of data shall not
disclose it to anyone without meeting an enumerated exception outlined
201
in the statute. As such, “no random member of the public could” have
requested and received Skinner’s cell data from his “cell phone company
202
for the right to track [his] location.” Members of the general public
203
could not even subpoena the phone companies to get this type of data.
Only government agents can use orders under section 2703 of the SCA to
204
request this information. The Sixth Circuit should have considered that
the general public does not have access to cell phone location data when
205
determining Skinner’s reasonable expectation to privacy.
B. Length-of-Trip and Type-of-Offense
According to Justice Alito’s analysis, “relatively short-term
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets,” similar to those
206
upheld in Knotts, is reasonable. However, Justice Alito wrote that “the
use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
207
impinges on expectations of privacy.” For these types of offenses,
“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
would not . . . secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of
208
an individual’s car for a very long period.” He did not conclude how

199. Gelb, supra note 85, at 31. See generally Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986)
(finding a knowing exposure exception to the warrant requirement where federal agents utilized an
aerial mapping camera to enhance that which the human eye could not observe from a lawful vantage
point without trespassing).
200. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35–36.
201. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) (2012); see also id.§ 2701(b)(1)–(8) (enumerating exceptions).
202. Sobel et al., supra note 178, at 40.
203. O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 89 (2006) (stating that SCA has no exception
for civil discovery).
204. See generally Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 99; see also supra Part VI (discussing the
fundamental unfairness of this statute in the criminal discovery process).
205. For an additional critique, see Recent Cases, supra note 150, at 802. The authors argue that the
Sixth Circuit should have expanded the majority’s opinion in Jones and created an “electronic
trespass.” Id. According to the authors, the court could have evaluated whether the “pinging” process
constitutes an electronic form of trespass and had it done so, it could have decided the case on Justice
Scalia’s trespass rationale. Id. “Because pinging is an active process that could be considered an
electronic trespass, the court could have selected an approach that under Jones might have forestalled
its Katz analysis entirely and allowed Congress to set the standards in this evolving area of law and
technology.” Id.
206. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. Id.
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long is too long, but that the surveillance surely became unconstitutional
209
before the four-week mark. “Justice Alito’s temporal limit frees
‘relatively short-term monitoring’ from Fourth Amendment oversight
but extends Fourth Amendment protections to ‘longer term GPS
210
monitoring.’” Prior to Jones, many lower courts also struggled with
GPS monitoring and how long the monitoring must last before it
211
becomes unreasonable.
However, courts will likely continue to struggle with Jones because
Justice Alito’s concurrence unfortunately provides little guidance “about
how to resolve Fourth Amendment privacy claims apart from its crucial
212
distinction between brief and prolonged GPS tracking.” Some have
even said that his analysis is not helpful because “it offered only a single
213
paragraph of analysis in determining that four weeks was too long.”
Similarly, the Skinner Court found Justice Alito’s concurrence
inapplicable because the Jones case “involved intensive monitoring over
a 28-day period . . . [as opposed to] the DEA agents [who] only tracked
214
Skinner’s cell phone for three days.”
Despite the flaw of establishing no clear line between brief and
prolonged tracking, Justice Alito could consider other factors of the
surveillance in Skinner to determine that the tracking was too long. He
could take into account factors such as the distance of the surveillance,
whether it was around the clock, and whether it crossed different
215
jurisdictions. Justice Scalia’s property-based rationale is silent in regard
to these additional factors as they are irrelevant to physical trespass. In
contrast, Justice Alito’s analysis leaves open the possibility to include
these factors when examining a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cell phone location data.
Besides the length of the offense, Justice Alito considers the type of
underlying offense. Jones and Skinner’s offenses are similar because they
both involve drug conspiracies. As such, Skinner’s offense would not fit
into Justice Alito’s exception involving investigating extraordinary

209. Id.
210. Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 44.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that twenty-eight
days was too much), aff’d in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). But see United
States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that sixty hours was not enough),
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012); United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2011) (raising a
theoretical concern about GPS monitoring, but distinguishing itself from Maynard based on the length
of the trip and the surveillance not being around the clock).
212. Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 45.
213. Leading Cases, Fourth Amendment—Search and GPS Surveillance: United States v. Jones,
126 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 233 (2013).
214. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013).
However, length of trip is not the only factor and Justice Alito’s analysis would not change solely on
the trip lasting three days.
215. See infra Part VI.A.
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offenses. In extraordinary cases, Justice Alito stated “long-term tracking
216
might have been mounted using previously available techniques.”
Furthermore, in Justice Sotomayor’s “statement of agreement with Justice
Alito that long term monitoring impinges expectations of privacy, Justice
217
Sotomayor qualified her statement as applicable to ‘most offenses.’”
However, Justice Alito’s concurrence would still be applicable because
Skinner does not deal with an extraordinary offense.
V. Justice Sotomayor–the Fifth Vote
For “Alito’s Way” to become a majority opinion, he needs one
more vote, as four Justices have already signed on to his concurrence.
Justice Sotomayor is the most likely fifth vote because her concurring
opinion has a much broader interpretation of an individual’s reasonable
expectation to privacy. There is a much stronger chance to overturn the
Sixth Circuit with Justice Alito’s framework because there is no guarantee
a majority of the current Justices would adopt Justice Sotomayor’s ideas,
218
especially revisiting the third-party doctrine. Justice Sotomayor agreed
that the physical intrusion is a Fourth Amendment violation at a
minimum but also discussed the reasonable expectation of privacy, shifts
in technology, and a willingness to revisit the third-party doctrine, as that
219
approach is ill-suited to the digital age. She also alluded to the
adaptation of the mosaic theory of a reasonable expectation of privacy
when discussing GPS surveillance because it “generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
220
sexual associations.” However, she expressly agreed that, “at the very

216. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
217. Murphy, supra note 18, at 337 (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
218. For general critical discussions of the third-party doctrine, see Katherine J. Strandburg,
Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 Md.
L. Rev. 614, 680 (2011); Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment 17 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third
Hand: Lessons from the Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1199, 1202
(2009) (suggesting that an alternative set of rules that “produces the best mix of privacy and security”
is preferable to the reasonable expectations test); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth
Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 Pepp. L.
Rev. 975, 977 (2007) (suggesting a factor-based approach to the third party doctrine). But see Orin S.
Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561, 563–66 (2009) (arguing that critics
of the third-party doctrine overlook its substantial benefits).
219. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 955. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). This is commonly referred to as the “mosaic theory.”
See supra note 188; see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing
mosaic theory of Jones’s movements), aff’d in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945; United States v.
Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“By tracking and
recording the movements of millions of individuals the government can use computers to detect
patterns and develop suspicions.”), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012). But see generally Orin S. Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 311 (2012).
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least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy’” and would agree with Justice
221
Alito’s interpretation.

VI. Refining Alito’s Way
Justice Alito’s concurrence has prompted two common critiques: that
it (1) does not define what period of surveillance is too long, and (2) does
222
not define which types of offenses are extraordinary. This Part briefly
223
refines these two elements and provides suggestions to future courts that
employ Justice Alito’s opinion to determine when the collection of
warrantless cell phone location data becomes unconstitutional.
A. Refining the Length-of-Trip Prong
Justice Alito focused on the number of days to determine when
surveillance lasts too long. This Note proposes that courts should adopt a
multi-factor test and look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the surveillance in dispute. Based on the language of Justice Alito’s
opinion, the number of days would be the most important factor. A court
should also strongly consider Justice Alito’s language that the
surveillance should be similar to the type upheld in Knotts and ask: Did
the government agents ever have any visual contact? This is an important
factor because it concerns allocation of government resources and
“provides guidance as to his thinking because he had earlier emphasized
that, prior to technological advances, practical resource constraints had
limited the amount and intrusiveness of governmental searches, with the
government choosing to make special efforts only in rare and significant
224
cases.” Courts could also consider factors such as the distance of the
surveillance, whether it was around the clock, and whether it crossed
jurisdictions.
In Skinner’s case, Justice Alito could consider the fact that the DEA
225
never conducted any visual surveillance. Also, he could take into
account the overall distance. In this case, the DEA monitored Skinner as
226
he drove from Tucson, Arizona, to Abilene, Texas. This warrantless
227
tracking lasted for more than 760 miles. A final fact to consider is that
the tracking crossed state lines. When considering these various factors,

221. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
222. See supra notes 18, 196.
223. See supra Parts V.B–C.
224. Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 66.
225. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013).
226. Id.
227. See Driving Distance from Tucson, AZ,. to Abilene, TX, TravelMath, http://www.travelmath
.com (Use “Travel Calculator” on homepage; then search “Get” for “driving distance”, search “From”
for “Tucson, AZ” and search “To” for “Abilene, TX”; then follow “Calculate” hyperlink).
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the tracking in Skinner would likely satisfy the “length-of-trip” prong of
Justice Alito’s concurrence.
B. Refining the Type-of-Offense Prong
As discussed in Subpart VI.C, Jones and Skinner had committed
similar offenses involving drug trafficking conspiracies. This Note
proposes that Justice Alito’s “extraordinary offenses” would rarely
include the surveillance of criminal enterprises in the smuggling and
trafficking of contraband such as drugs, weapons, or counterfeit goods.
228
229
Jones and Skinner illustrate this proposal. In Jones, although the
agents applied for a warrant, they did not follow the magistrate Judge’s
guidelines. Both of these cases involved ongoing investigations with
multiple parties that most likely took a substantial amount of time to
thoroughly investigate. In this regard, there was ample opportunity for
the government agents to make a probable cause showing and for
determinations to access Skinner’s cell phone location data “be drawn by
a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
230
engaged in the ‘often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”
Justice Alito would likely require a warrant in these circumstances.
In contrast, this Note hypothesizes that courts would find that the
definition of an extraordinary offense includes exigent circumstances. One
example would be the kidnapping of a child. If there was an “Amber
Alert” issued after a child had been kidnapped and the police had a
suspect, the police should be able to immediately request the suspect’s cell
phone location data to help track the suspect. One scholar has also argued
that terrorism would fit into Justice Alito’s extraordinary offense analysis
231
as well. As the Skinner case does not include these types of facts, his
alleged crimes would not be extraordinary offenses and Skinner would
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone location data.

Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Skinner illustrates the inherent
limitations of Justice Scalia’s property-based holding in Jones. As this
Note has discussed, technologies like pinging and cell phone location
data make it unnecessary for government officials to place a GPS on a
suspect’s car if they want to track the suspect. By focusing on Justice
Alito’s concurrence and his three prongs of analysis (Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the length of tracking, and the type of offense), courts can
protect individuals like Skinner and Jones from unchecked government

228.
229.
230.
231.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part III.A.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Arcila, Jr., supra note 43, at 68.
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232

intrusion. Although the majority opinion may ultimately be of limited
value in protecting the privacy interests of Americans as technology such
as cell phone location data makes physical intrusions obsolete, courts can
correct this by using “Alito’s Way” to hold that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell location data.

232. Phillip Smith & Clarence Walker, How Can a Man Who Won an Appeal, and a Major Supreme
Court Case, Still be Locked Up for Life?, AlterNet (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/
story/154394/how_can_a_man_who_won_an_appeal,_and_a_major_supreme_court_case,_still_be_locked
_up_for_life (reporting that Jones said after his victory at the Supreme Court, “I am very happy with the
Supreme Court decision and I hope the decision helps millions of Americans preserve their right to have
reasonable expectation of privacy”).

